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OPINION 
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SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
 
For over half a century, this Court has been the 
final interpreter of Virgin Islands law. In that role, we 
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have made an incalculable number of rulings and have 
issued hundreds of decisions. But our role changed in 
2007 with the founding of the Supreme Court of the 
Virgin Islands. We must now decide whether and when 
that nascent Supreme Court may reject our pre-2007 
interpretations of Virgin Islands law.1
I 
 
Lenroy Phillip and Timothy Defoe worked 
together at an oil refinery in the United States Virgin 
Islands. On October 27, 2007, Phillip was driving a 
company-owned vehicle near the refinery when it struck 
Defoe. Phillip received a citation from their employer for 
inattentive driving.  
While recovering from his injuries, Defoe filed a 
claim and received benefits under the Virgin Islands 
Workers’ Compensation Act, 24 V.I. Code § 250 et seq. 
He also sued Phillip for negligence in the Superior Court 
of the Virgin Islands. The Superior Court granted 
                                           
1 Pursuant to its congressionally granted authority, 
the Virgin Islands legislature created the Supreme Court 
of the Virgin Islands in 2004, see 4 V.I. Code § 2, but the 
Supreme Court did not begin to exercise its judicial 
authority until January 29, 2007. For convenience, we 
refer to decisions from before the time it began 
exercising its authority as pre-2007 decisions.  
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summary judgment for Phillip. It relied on our decision 
in Tavarez v. Klingensmith, 372 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 2004), 
in which we held that the Workers’ Compensation Act 
prevents injured employees from suing their coworkers. 
Id. at 192 (citing 24 V.I. Code § 284). The Superior 
Court therefore rejected Defoe’s negligence claim. 
Defoe appealed to the Supreme Court of the Virgin 
Islands. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the 
Act’s immunity provision does not prevent suits against 
coworkers. Defoe v. Phillip, No. 2009-0007, 2012 WL 
37404, at *2 (V.I. Jan. 5, 2012) (per curiam). Before 
reaching that conclusion, the Supreme Court declared 
that it was no longer bound by this Court’s pre-2007 
decisions on Virgin Islands law—even while 
acknowledging that the Superior Court remains bound by 
those decisions until the Supreme Court says otherwise. 
Id. at *3–4; see also People v. Murell, No. 2011-0074, 
2012 WL 2308543, at *6 (V.I. May 15, 2012) (stating 
that the Supreme Court need not follow two of our 
precedents on questions of local law). The Supreme 
Court then rejected our holding in Tavarez and remanded 
to the Superior Court to determine whether Phillip 
actually was negligent. 
Phillip turned to us. We granted Phillip’s certiorari 
petition to decide “[w]hether the Supreme Court of the 
Virgin Islands has the authority, under 48 U.S.C. § 1613, 
to disregard precedent set by the Third Circuit Court of 
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Appeals during a time when the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals was the only source of binding authority 
construing territorial law.” See Order Granting Pet. Writ 
Cert. at 1, Defoe v. Phillip, No. 12-1586 (3d Cir. May 10, 
2012) (citing Pet. Writ Cert. at 9). We also directed the 
parties to address “whether this Court has jurisdiction 
over the petition pursuant to 48 U.S.C. § 1613.” Id. 
Before resolving these questions, a review of the Virgin 
Islands court system is in order. 
II 
Congress laid the groundwork for the current 
Virgin Islands court system nearly sixty years ago. See 
generally Revised Organic Act of 1954, 48 U.S.C. 
§ 1541 et seq. The Revised Organic Act enabled the 
Virgin Islands legislature to create its own court system, 
including trial courts and an appellate court. Id. 
§ 1611(b).  
In addition, the Act established the District Court 
of the Virgin Islands—an Article IV court—and gave it 
original jurisdiction over local claims. Id. §§ 1611(a), 
1612(b). It also gave the District Court concurrent 
jurisdiction over any local crimes that are sufficiently 
similar to federal crimes. See Callwood v. Enos, 230 F.3d 
627, 631 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing 48 U.S.C. § 1612 (c)). 
Until recently, the District Court served as more than a 
trial court. The Appellate Division of the District Court 
also heard all appeals from local courts. 48 U.S.C. 
6 
 
§ 1613a(a). In turn, our Court had appellate jurisdiction 
over appeals from the Appellate Division. Id. § 1613a(c). 
Such review was a matter of right. 
Congress changed this system in 1984 by 
amending the Revised Organic Act. This amendment 
enabled the Virgin Islands legislature to vest original 
jurisdiction over local actions exclusively in local courts. 
Parrott v. Gov’t of U.S. Virgin Islands, 230 F.3d 615, 
619 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing 48 U.S.C. §§ 1611(a), 
1612(b)). The Virgin Islands exercised that power, 
vesting exclusive jurisdiction over local actions in the 
Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands—now known as 
the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands. 4 V.I. Code § 2. 
After this amendment, the District Court continued to 
hear appeals from local trial courts, and it retained 
concurrent jurisdiction over local crimes that are similar 
to federal crimes. See Callwood, 230 F.3d at 631. 
The next major change came in 2004. Fifty years 
after receiving authority to do so, the Virgin Islands 
legislature established its own appellate court—the 
Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands. See 4 V.I. Code § 2. 
The Supreme Court, composed of three justices, began 
exercising its judicial authority on January 29, 2007. It 
handed down its first decision later that year. It continues 
to hear all appeals from the Superior Court of the Virgin 
Islands. See id. §§ 21(a), 32, 33.  
The founding of the Virgin Islands Supreme Court 
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altered the relationship between the federal judiciary and 
the Virgin Islands court system. Going forward, the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands no longer has 
appellate jurisdiction over any local decisions.2
[F]or the first fifteen years following the 
establishment of the appellate court 
authorized by section 1611(a) of this title, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit shall have jurisdiction to 
review by writ of certiorari all final 
 See 48 
U.S.C. § 1613a(a) (indicating that the District Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction ends once the Virgin Islands 
legislature creates its own appellate court). Instead, as set 
out in 48 U.S.C. § 1613, we have certiorari jurisdiction 
over the Virgin Islands Supreme Court: 
                                           
2 On appeal, the District Court still reviews 
territorial cases that were “pending in [the District 
Court]” before the establishment of the Supreme Court, 
and we still hear appeals from those decisions. 48 U.S.C. 
§ 1613a(d) (“The establishment of the appellate court 
shall not result in the loss of jurisdiction of the district 
court over any appeal then pending in it. The rulings of 
the district court on such appeals may be reviewed in the 
. . . Third Circuit and in the Supreme Court 
notwithstanding the establishment of the appellate 
court.”). 
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decisions of the highest court of the Virgin 
Islands from which a decision could be had. 
Our certiorari jurisdiction will last for a maximum 
of fifteen years. After that, the Virgin Islands Supreme 
Court will have the same role as the highest court of any 
state—it will be the final authority on Virgin Islands law. 
The United States Supreme Court will review its 
decisions on federal law, and we will no longer have 
appellate jurisdiction over its decisions. In the meantime, 
we have established rules that govern the process of 
granting certiorari petitions. See, e.g., Third Circuit Local 
Appellate Rule 112.1(a) (“Review on writ of certiorari is 
not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion, and will 
be granted only when there are special and important 
reasons therefor.”).3
The fifteen-year period established by § 1613 is 
merely a default. The statute requires our Court to submit 
a report to Congress every five years after the creation of 
 
                                           
3 Our local rules provide a list of reasons for 
granting certiorari petitions. Relevant to this case, we 
will grant a petition if “[t]he Supreme Court of the Virgin 
Islands has decided a question in a way that conflicts 
with applicable decisions of this court.” Local Appellate 
Rule 112.1(1)(a). 
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the Virgin Islands Supreme Court.4
Earlier this year, a committee from the Third 
Circuit prepared the initial five-year report.
 The purpose of the 
report is to evaluate “whether it has developed sufficient 
institutional traditions to justify direct review by the 
Supreme Court of the United States from all [ ] final 
decisions.” 48 U.S.C. § 1613.  
5
                                           
4 The relevant language from 48 U.S.C. § 1613 
states: 
The Judicial Council of the Third Circuit 
shall submit reports to the Committee on 
Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate 
and the Committee on Natural Resources of 
the House of Representatives at intervals of 
five years following the establishment of 
such appellate court as to whether it has 
developed sufficient institutional traditions 
to justify direct review by the Supreme 
Court of the United States from all such 
final decisions. 
5 The committee members included Circuit Judge 
D. Brooks Smith, Senior Circuit Judge Walter Stapleton, 
and Third Circuit Clerk Marcia Waldron. 
 See Judicial 
Council of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit, Report on the Virgin Islands Supreme Court 
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(2012), available at 
http://www.visupremecourt.org/wfData/files/BookletRep
ortofVirginIslandsSupremeCourt.pdf. The committee 
reviewed the Supreme Court’s decisions, practices, 
facilities, and day-to-day operations. It concluded “that 
the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands ‘has developed 
sufficient institutional traditions to justify direct review 
by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” Id. at 17 
(quoting 48 U.S.C. § 1613). The committee 
recommended that Congress eliminate our certiorari 
jurisdiction. Id. Still, Congress must act for that 
recommendation to take effect.6
                                           
6 We acknowledge that, based on the committee’s 
recommendation, both houses of Congress recently 
passed H.R. 6116, a bill to eliminate this Court’s interim 
certiorari jurisdiction over final decisions of the Supreme 
Court in favor of direct certiorari review by the United 
States Supreme Court. See An Act to Amend the Revised 
Organic Act of the Virgin Islands, H.R. 6116, 112th 
Cong. (2012) (passed by the House and the Senate as of 
December 13, 2012). Because the president has not 
signed H.R. 6116 as of this opinion’s publication, we 
need not consider its effect on our certiorari jurisdiction 
over this case. See I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951–
52 (1983) (concluding that Congress can exercise 
legislative power only through bicameralism and 
presentment). 
 For now, we retain 
certiorari jurisdiction over final decisions of the Virgin 
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Islands Supreme Court. 
III 
We first address the question of appellate 
jurisdiction. During our interim certiorari period, we have 
authority to “review by writ of certiorari all final 
decisions of the highest court of the Virgin Islands from 
which a decision could be had.” 48 U.S.C. § 1613. The 
question is whether the Virgin Islands Supreme Court’s 
order reversing the Superior Court and remanding for 
further proceedings satisfied the “final decisions” 
requirement in § 1613. We conclude that it did. 
We recently considered the meaning of the term 
“final decisions.” See Virgin Islands v. John, 654 F.3d 
412 (3d Cir. 2011). Under John, a decision is final only if 
it is “‘final’ within the meaning of the United States 
Supreme Court’s certiorari jurisdiction statute.” Id. at 415 
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (“Final judgments or decrees 
rendered by the highest court of a State . . . may be 
reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of 
certiorari . . . .”)). In general, a judgment is final under 
the Supreme Court’s certiorari statute only if nothing 
“further remains to be determined by a State court, no 
matter how dissociated from the [ ] federal issue that has 
finally been adjudicated by the highest court of the 
State.” Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 477 
(1975) (quoting Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 
326 U.S. 120, 124 (1945)) (quotation marks omitted). 
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Here, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court remanded to the 
Superior Court, and the Superior Court still needs to 
decide whether Phillip was negligent. This posture 
suggests that the Supreme Court’s decision was not final.  
Yet the definition of a “final decision” is not so 
absolute. The United States Supreme Court has 
recognized four exceptions to the finality rule: 
In the first category are those cases in which 
there are further proceedings—even entire 
trials—yet to occur in the state courts but 
where for one reason or another the federal 
issue is conclusive or the outcome of further 
proceedings preordained. . . . 
Second, there are cases . . . in which the 
federal issue, finally decided by the highest 
court in the State, will survive and require 
decision regardless of the outcome of future 
state-court proceedings. . . . 
In the third category are those situations 
where the federal claim has been finally 
decided, with further proceedings on the 
merits in the state courts to come, but in 
which later review of the federal issue 
cannot be had, whatever the ultimate 
outcome of the case. . . . 
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Lastly, there are those situations where the 
federal issue has been finally decided in the 
state courts with further proceedings 
pending in which the party seeking review 
here might prevail on the merits on 
nonfederal grounds, thus rendering 
unnecessary review of the federal issue by 
this Court, and where reversal of the state 
court on the federal issue would be 
preclusive of any further litigation on the 
relevant cause of action rather than merely 
controlling the nature and character of, or 
determining the admissibility of evidence in, 
the state proceedings still to come. In these 
circumstances, if a refusal immediately to 
review the state court decision might 
seriously erode federal policy, the Court has 
entertained and decided the federal issue, 
which itself has been finally determined by 
the state courts for purposes of the state 
litigation. 
Id. at 479–83. When one of these exceptions applies, the 
Supreme Court will review a state court’s ruling on a 
federal issue even when additional issues await resolution 
in the lower courts. In such instances, “immediate rather 
than delayed review would be the best way to avoid the 
mischief of economic waste and of delayed justice.” Id. 
at 477–78 (quoting Radio Station WOW, 326 U.S. at 124) 
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(quotation marks omitted).  
We conclude that the Cox exceptions apply to the 
finality requirement in our certiorari statute—albeit with 
one difference. The Supreme Court reviews state 
decisions only on questions of federal law. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1257. By contrast, we review decisions of the Virgin 
Islands Supreme Court on questions of both federal and 
local law. See Pichardo v. V.I. Com’r of Labor, 613 F.3d 
87, 94 (3d Cir. 2010). As a result, we apply the 
exceptions by examining the federal or local issue that 
the Supreme Court has decided—again, even though 
additional issues might await resolution. In effect, we 
apply the language from Cox by replacing the phrase 
“federal issue” with the phrase “federal or local issue.” 
According to Phillip, this case fits within the third 
and fourth exceptions.7
                                           
7 Phillip argues that Local Appellate Rule 112.1 
provides another basis for jurisdiction. But this rule 
simply states our policy for granting certiorari—it does 
not create an additional basis for jurisdiction. Only 
Congress can do that. 
 We disagree—at least with 
respect to the third exception. If we remand for lack of 
jurisdiction, we could still review the Supreme Court’s 
decision after the losing party filed another petition. 
Phillip argues that res judicata would prevent us from 
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granting certiorari. This argument is based on a 
misunderstanding of res judicata, which prevents parties 
from making the same claim in separate actions—not 
from making the same argument on separate appeals in a 
single action. See United States v. 5 Unlabeled Boxes, 
572 F.3d 169, 173 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting that res judicata 
applies only if there was “a final judgment on the merits 
in a prior suit” (emphasis added)). 
That leaves the fourth exception. Subsequent 
Supreme Court cases have confirmed that the exception 
applies if three requirements are met: (1) the appellant 
might prevail at trial on separate grounds; (2) reversing 
the state court would end the litigation on the claim; and 
(3) failing to review the decision “might seriously erode 
federal policy.” Florida v. Thomas, 532 U.S. 774, 780 
(2001); Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 
55 (1989).  
This case meets the first two requirements. Phillip 
might prevail at trial on separate grounds—for example, 
the Superior Court might conclude that he was not 
negligent or that Defoe assumed the risk of injury. And if 
we reversed the Supreme Court by concluding that 
Tavarez still applies, our decision would effectively 
reinstate the Superior Court’s grant of summary 
judgment and thus would end the litigation. The question, 
then, is whether this case meets the third requirement—
that is, whether failing to review the Supreme Court’s 
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decision “might seriously erode federal policy.” 
This question requires a case-by-case inquiry. In 
Florida v. Thomas, the United States Supreme Court 
concluded that a suppression motion did not invoke 
sufficient “federal policy” concerns. 532 U.S. at 780 
(“Here the State can make no claim of serious erosion of 
federal policy that is not common to all run-of-the-mine 
decisions suppressing evidence in criminal trials.”). By 
comparison, in Fort Wayne Books v. Indiana, the Court 
concluded that an Indiana case met this requirement 
because the case held that a specific application of the 
Indiana Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization 
statute was unconstitutional. “[A] challenge to the 
constitutionality of the use of RICO statutes to 
criminalize patterns of obscenity offenses calls into 
question the legitimacy of the law enforcement practices 
of several States, as well as the Federal Government.” 
489 U.S. at 55. It also pointed out that “[a]djudicating the 
proper scope of First Amendment protections has often 
been recognized by this Court as a ‘federal policy’ that 
merits application of an exception to the general finality 
rule.” Id.  
This case also meets the third requirement. Our 
Court has had a significant role in overseeing the Virgin 
Islands Supreme Court. See 48 U.S.C. § 1613; Pichardo, 
613 F.3d at 100 n.11 (“[W]e are entrusted with the task 
of overseeing the development of the Virgin Islands 
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Supreme Court’s institutional traditions.” (quotation 
marks omitted)). We have certiorari jurisdiction over the 
Supreme Court’s decisions—both on questions of federal 
law and on questions of local law. See Pichardo, 613 
F.3d at 94. And, by law, we are required to submit 
regular reports to Congress evaluating the Supreme 
Court’s progress. 48 U.S.C. § 1613. Having chosen to 
invest in us this oversight role by statute, Congress has 
declared a specific federal policy, the relevant federal 
policy for Cox purposes. We believe that if we failed to 
review the Supreme Court’s Defoe decision at this time, 
we would weaken our oversight role—and in doing so, 
would seriously erode federal policy. After all, by not 
reviewing that decision, we would leave the precedential 
posture of our pre-2007 territorial cases undecided. To 
prevent such uncertainty—and to avoid shirking our 
oversight role—we conclude that we have jurisdiction 
under § 1613.  
IV 
We now consider whether the Virgin Islands 
Supreme Court may reject our pre-2007 decisions on 
local law. Upon its establishment, the Virgin Islands 
Supreme Court became the final authority on local law—
subject to a qualification discussed below. We 
recognized that the Supreme Court would assume this 
role even before its creation. See BA Props. Inc. v. Gov’t 
of U.S. Virgin Islands, 299 F.3d 207, 212 (3d Cir. 2002) 
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(“[The Virgin Islands Supreme Court] would essentially 
have the final word on the interpretation of local Virgin 
Islands law.”). And we reaffirmed this conclusion five 
years later when the Virgin Islands legislature actually 
created the Supreme Court. See Edwards v. HOVENSA, 
LLC, 497 F.3d 355, 361 n.3 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that 
“[g]oing forward, now that the Virgin Islands has 
established an insular appellate court [it] will begin 
developing indigenous jurisprudence” (emphasis 
added)).  
As a result, when the District Court faces a novel 
question of Virgin Islands law, it must predict how the 
Supreme Court will resolve that question. Id. And we 
must make similar predictions. A few years ago, we 
interpreted a Virgin Islands statute prohibiting 
unauthorized individuals from carrying firearms, 14 V.I. 
Code § 2253(a). Before doing so, we noted “the absence 
of controlling Virgin Islands precedent.” Gov’t of U.S. 
Virgin Islands v. Lewis, 620 F.3d 359, 364 n.5 (3d Cir. 
2010). We were “mindful, of course, that the authority to 
interpret [the statute] lies centrally with the newly created 
Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands.” Id. And we 
confirmed that our decision did not “preclude the 
Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands from offering its 
own interpretation.” Id.  
Consequently, our relationship with the Virgin 
Islands Supreme Court is much like our relationship with 
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other state courts—we generally defer on questions of 
local law. Such deference is consistent with the text of 
§ 1613, which assumes that the Virgin Islands Supreme 
Court will have the freedom to create its own 
“institutional traditions.” 48 U.S.C. § 1613 (“The 
relations between the courts established by the 
Constitution or laws of the United States and the courts 
established by local law . . . shall be governed by the 
laws of the United States pertaining to the relations 
between the courts of the United States . . . and the courts 
of the several States in such matters and proceedings.”). 
But our relationship with the Virgin Islands 
Supreme Court is different in at least one important 
respect. We have certiorari jurisdiction over the Virgin 
Islands Supreme Court. 48 U.S.C. § 1613. And unlike the 
United States Supreme Court’s certiorari statute, § 1613 
is not limited to decisions on federal law. We also have 
the discretion to review the Virgin Islands Supreme 
Court’s decisions on local law. See Pichardo, 613 F.3d at 
96 (noting that unlike the United States Supreme Court’s 
review of state-court decisions, “[o]ur review is not 
limited to cases that implicate the United States 
Constitution or federal law”).  
Because of this difference, we concluded in 
Pichardo that “[i]t is, subject to our review for manifest 
error, the role of the Virgin Islands Supreme Court to say 
what the law of the territory is. We will reverse a 
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decision of the Supreme Court . . . that is based upon 
territorial law only if it is inescapably wrong.” Id. at 94. 
In other words, the Supreme Court has assumed our 
erstwhile role as the final authority on territorial law, 
though with an important limitation: its decisions must 
not be manifestly erroneous or inescapably wrong.  
The Ninth Circuit adopted this standard nearly a 
decade ago. Haeuser v. Dep’t of Law, 368 F.3d 1091, 
1099 (9th Cir. 2004). By statute, the Ninth Circuit once 
had the same relationship with the Guam Supreme Court 
as the one we now enjoy with the Virgin Islands Supreme 
Court.8
                                           
8 Congress has since removed the Ninth Circuit’s 
certiorari jurisdiction. See 48 U.S.C. § 1424-2. But the 
Ninth Circuit’s former jurisdictional statute stated: 
 At the time, the Ninth Circuit concluded that it 
[F]or the first fifteen years following the 
establishment of the appellate court . . . , the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit shall have jurisdiction to review by 
writ of certiorari all final decisions of the 
highest court of Guam from which a 
decision could be had. The Judicial Council 
of the Ninth Circuit shall submit reports to 
the Committee on Energy and Natural 
Resources of the Senate and the Committee 
on Natural Resources of the House of 
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Representatives at intervals of five years 
following the establishment of such 
appellate court as to whether it has 
developed sufficient institutional traditions 
to justify direct review by the Supreme 
Court of the United States from all such 
final decisions. The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit shall have 
jurisdiction to promulgate rules necessary to 
carry out the provisions of this subsection. 
48 U.S.C. § 1424-2 (2000). This tracks the language from 
48 U.S.C. § 1613 (emphasis added to show differences): 
[F]or the first fifteen years following the 
establishment of the appellate court . . . , the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit shall have jurisdiction to review by 
writ of certiorari all final decisions of the 
highest court of the Virgin Islands from 
which a decision could be had. The Judicial 
Council of the Third Circuit shall submit 
reports to the Committee on Energy and 
Natural Resources of the Senate and the 
Committee on Natural Resources of the 
House of Representatives at intervals of five 
years following the establishment of such 
appellate court as to whether it has 
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would review local decisions of the Guam Supreme 
Court for manifest error. Id. (noting that the “degree of 
deference” owed to the Guam Supreme Court “does not 
allow us to reverse the Guam Supreme Court’s decisions 
on matters of local law unless clear or manifest error is 
shown”). 
The Ninth Circuit did not create the “manifest 
error” standard. Instead, the United States Supreme Court 
first articulated this standard in 1940. The Supreme Court 
concluded that the First Circuit—which once had a 
similar role in supervising the Supreme Court of Puerto 
Rico—should generally defer to local decisions of that 
territorial court. “For to justify reversal in such cases, the 
error must be clear or manifest; the interpretation must be 
inescapably wrong; the decision must be patently 
erroneous.” Sancho v. Texas Co., 308 U.S. 463, 471 
(1940). 
All of this is settled law. Pichardo requires us to 
affirm the decisions of the Virgin Islands Supreme Court 
                                                                                              
developed sufficient institutional traditions 
to justify direct review by the Supreme 
Court of the United States from all such 
final decisions. The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit shall have 
jurisdiction to promulgate rules necessary to 
carry out the provisions of this section. 
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that are based on territorial law unless those decisions are 
inescapably wrong. In Phillip’s mind, however, this 
deferential standard does not apply when the Supreme 
Court disregards one of our pre-2007 decisions on 
territorial law. Instead, as his argument goes, we should 
conclude that the Supreme Court is bound to our 
pronouncements from days gone by. 
As for our post-2007 precedents, we have already 
rejected this argument. We stated in Lewis “that the 
authority to interpret [a Virgin Islands statute] lies 
centrally with the newly created Supreme Court of the 
Virgin Islands. We do not mean by our decision today to 
preclude the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands from 
offering its own interpretation of [the statute].” 620 F.3d 
at 364 n.5 (citation omitted). The Supreme Court may 
disregard our post-2007 decisions on territorial law—
again, as long as the Court does not manifestly err in 
doing so.9
We see no reason to adopt a different standard for 
our pre-2007 precedents. Section 1613 does not 
distinguish between cases handed down before and after 
 
                                           
9 We should note that the Virgin Islands Supreme 
Court would not be free to reject our post-2007 decisions 
on local law if we had overturned a Supreme Court 
decision for being inescapably wrong. 
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the Supreme Court’s founding, nor do our precedents 
such as Pichardo and Lewis. In fact, § 1613 allows the 
Virgin Islands Supreme Court to develop its own 
“institutional traditions.” This assumes that the Supreme 
Court “will have the freedom” to create its own “legal 
precedent.” Pichardo, 613 F.3d at 98 (quoting Haeuser, 
368 F.3d at 1099). The Supreme Court would have far 
less freedom to do so if it remained bound to our pre-
2007 cases. 
More to the point, courts adopting the precedents 
of past courts typically have the freedom to overturn 
those precedents. For example, the Eleventh Circuit 
branched off from the Fifth Circuit in 1981. Although the 
Eleventh Circuit relies on pre-1981 Fifth Circuit cases, it 
is free to overrule them. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 
661 F.2d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (“The 
decisions of the former Fifth Circuit, adopted as 
precedent by the Eleventh Circuit, will, of course, be 
subject to the power of the Eleventh Circuit sitting en 
banc to overrule any such decision.”). The Supreme 
Court of Guam has similarly claimed the authority to 
reject Ninth Circuit precedents from a time when it 
provided the final word on local law: 
[T]his Court does not recognize the 
decisions of the Appellate Division [of the 
District Court of Guam] as controlling our 
construction of law. We consider its 
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opinions as precedent that is binding upon 
the trial courts of Guam, but these decisions, 
like those of the [Ninth Circuit] Court of 
Appeals, are considered persuasive authority 
when we consider an issue. . . . It should be 
underscored that the creation of the Supreme 
Court of Guam did not erase pre-existing 
case law. Precedent that was extant when we 
became operational continues unless and 
until we address the issues discussed there. 
Guam v. Quenga, No. CRA96-005, 1997 WL 460709, at 
*4 n.4 (Guam May 18, 1997). 
We therefore conclude that the Virgin Islands 
Supreme Court may reject our local decisions that 
predate its establishment. Of course, just as the Supreme 
Court of Guam was subject to a manifest-error standard 
of review during the Ninth Circuit’s short-lived certiorari 
period, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court is subject to the 
same standard of review during our certiorari period. 
This standard certainly limits the Supreme Court’s 
freedom to reject our decisions. But it does not force the 
Supreme Court to follow us in lock-step. 
In a last-ditch effort, Phillip contends that Local 
Appellate Rule 112.1(a)(1) binds the Supreme Court to 
our pre-2007 local decisions. This rule states that when 
deciding whether to grant certiorari, we will consider 
whether “[t]he Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands has 
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decided a question in a way that conflicts with applicable 
decisions of this court or the United States Supreme 
Court.” According to Phillip, this rule is an assertion that 
the Supreme Court must follow our pre-2007 precedents. 
But the rule makes no such assertion—it states that we 
will consider granting certiorari when the Supreme Court 
disagrees with us, nothing more. 
V 
The final question is whether the Supreme Court’s 
decision to reject Tavarez was manifestly erroneous. 
Phillip argues that any disagreement with our precedents 
meets this standard such that no additional inquiry is 
necessary. If we reject this absolute rule, Phillip also 
argues that the Supreme Court’s decision to reject 
Tavarez in particular was manifestly erroneous. We 
reject both arguments.  
First, however, we consider what it means for a 
decision to be manifestly erroneous or inescapably 
wrong. We have yet to conclude that a decision of the 
Virgin Islands Supreme Court meets this standard. For its 
part, the Ninth Circuit only once concluded that a 
decision of the Supreme Court of Guam was manifestly 
erroneous. In Haeuser, the Ninth Circuit overturned the 
Guam Supreme Court for failing to apply a rule that it 
had adopted in the same opinion. 368 F.3d at 1101 
(“[T]he Supreme Court was required, under the very 
standard it announced earlier in its opinion, to review 
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‘the record . . . in its entirety,’ and then apply the law to 
the facts.”) (quoting Haeuser v. Dep’t of Law, No. 
CVA98-009, 1999 WL 257611, at *2 (Guam Apr. 30, 
1999)). 
According to the United States Supreme Court, to 
reverse under this standard, “it would not be sufficient if 
we . . . merely disagreed with that interpretation. Nor 
would it be enough that the . . . tribunal chose what might 
seem, on appeal, to be the less reasonable of two possible 
interpretations.” Sancho, 308 U.S. at 471. To warrant 
reversal, then, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court must 
commit an egregious error—for example, by issuing an 
opinion with a significant internal inconsistency or by 
blatantly ignoring the plain text of a statute. More than 
mere disagreement is necessary. 
We refuse to say that any disagreement with our 
precedents is, without further question, manifestly 
erroneous. For starters, some issues of local law are 
within the discretion of the highest court in that 
jurisdiction. For example, the Virgin Islands Supreme 
Court has the authority to shape the common law within 
the Virgin Islands. See Banks v. Int’l Rental & Leasing 
Corp., 55 V.I. 967, 980 (2011) (concluding that it 
“possesses the inherent power to shape the common law 
in the Virgin Islands”). It is unclear how its common-law 
decisions could be inescapably wrong—even those 
decisions that disagree with our pre-2007 cases—because 
28 
 
it has the inherent authority to shape the common law as 
it deems appropriate. 
But the common law is not at issue in this case. 
We face a question of statutory interpretation, and such 
questions are more likely to have answers that are either 
objectively right or objectively wrong. Even so, we 
cannot say that all disagreements with us must be wrong. 
After all, we implicitly acknowledge that our precedents 
are imperfect when we decide to limit or overrule them. 
See, e.g., In re Grossman’s Inc., 607 F.3d 114, 121 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (en banc) (overruling a sixteen-year-old 
precedent); Animal Sci. Products, Inc. v. China 
Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462, 467–68 & n.6 (3d Cir. 
2011) (overruling two Third Circuit precedents that 
conflicted with Supreme Court case law); see also 
Montana v. Hall, 481 U.S. 400, 408 (1987) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (“We are not infallible, as is evidenced, for 
example, by the number of cases each Term that are 
dismissed after plenary briefing and oral argument as 
having been improvidently granted.”). And the Supreme 
Court explicitly acknowledges our imperfections any 
time it reverses a decision of this Court. See, e.g, 
Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S. Ct. 2060, 2065 (2012) (per 
curiam), rev’g Johnson v. Mechling, 446 F. App’x 531 
(3d Cir. 2011). We therefore reject Phillip’s general 
argument that any disagreement with our pre-2007 cases 
is necessarily wrong. 
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We turn to Phillip’s alternative argument that the 
Supreme Court manifestly erred when it rejected Tavarez 
in particular. Defoe rejects this argument, but he first 
contends that we should not consider this question at all. 
For one thing, Defoe claims that this narrow question is 
outside the scope of certiorari. We disagree. We granted 
certiorari to decide whether the Supreme Court “has the 
authority, under 48 U.S.C. § 1613, to disregard precedent 
set by the Third Circuit . . . .” See Order Granting Pet. 
Writ Cert. at 1, Defoe, No. 12-1586 (emphasis added) 
(citing Pet. Writ Cert. at 9). We interpret the word 
“precedent” to mean both precedents generally and 
Tavarez in particular. The parties apparently adopted this 
interpretation, too—both sides addressed the Supreme 
Court’s treatment of Tavarez in their briefs.10
Next, Defoe claims that the Supreme Court’s 
decision does not conflict with our decision in Tavarez. 
This suggestion is wrong. Defoe points out that the 
defendant in Tavarez was the plaintiff’s supervisor, see 
372 F.3d at 189, whereas Phillip was merely Defoe’s 
 
                                           
10 In our view, it is significant that our grant of 
certiorari used the singular form “precedent,” not the 
plural form “precedents.” Moreover, the greater includes 
the lesser, and Tavarez certainly is a precedent of our 
Court. Finally, Defoe is not harmed by our interpretation 
because we ultimately affirm the Supreme Court. 
30 
 
coworker. This factual distinction is of no consequence 
because Tavarez explicitly applies to coworkers as well. 
See id. at 191 (noting that “scrutiny of the plain language 
. . . fails to reveal any intent by the Virgin Islands’ 
legislature to address whether an injured employee may 
initiate a civil action against a co-employee or a 
supervisor of the same employer” (emphasis added)). For 
that reason, the Supreme Court rightly concluded that its 
decision conflicts with ours. Defoe, 2012 WL 37404, at 
*12 (“We acknowledge that the Superior Court faithfully 
applied precedent that is binding on it when it granted 
Phillip’s motion for summary judgment based on 
Tavarez.”). 
That brings us back to Phillip’s claim that the 
Supreme Court erroneously rejected Tavarez. In Tavarez, 
we interpreted 24 V.I. Code § 284: 
(a) When an employer is insured under this 
chapter, the right herein established to 
obtain compensation shall be the only 
remedy against the employer . . . . 
(b) For the purposes of this section, . . . [t]he 
‘statutory employer and borrowed servant’ 
doctrine are not recognized in this 
jurisdiction, and an injured employee may 
sue any person responsible for his injuries 
other than the employer named in a 
certificate of insurance . . . . 
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We concluded that § 284(a) prevents law suits against 
coworkers, despite the statement in subsection (b) that 
“an injured employee may sue any person responsible for 
his injuries other than the employer named in a certificate 
of insurance” (emphasis added). We held that “§ 284(b) 
alters only the immunity that statutory employers 
previously enjoyed, subjecting these statutory employers 
to personal liability if they are not named in the 
certificate of insurance.” Tavarez, 372 F.3d at 192.  
The statutory canon ejusdem generis supports this 
interpretation. As we concluded in Tavarez, “the general 
term ‘any person’ in the second sentence of § 284(b) is a 
reference to the preceding specific terminology 
discussing statutory employers and borrowed servants.” 
Id. This means that the term “any person” does not 
include coworkers generally. In addition, suits against 
coworkers might frustrate the purpose of § 284(a) 
because “an employer would normally indemnify or 
assume the defense of its employee sued for negligence.” 
Id.  
In our view, Tavarez remains the soundest 
interpretation of § 284. Even so, to warrant reversal, 
Defoe must be more than simply wrong. It must be 
inescapably wrong. And the Supreme Court’s opinion 
does not meet this standard. As we recognized in 
Tavarez, the Supreme Court’s interpretation is defensible 
on textual grounds: “[T]he apparent breadth of the term 
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‘any person,’ combined with the fact that [the defendant] 
was not personally named in the certificate of insurance, 
appears to give [that] argument some support.” Id. at 191. 
The analysis in Defoe is quite thorough and not 
obviously flawed. The Supreme Court cited twenty-eight 
instances where, despite a statutory scheme creating 
employer immunity, a court has allowed an injured 
employee to sue a coworker. See Defoe, 2012 WL 37404, 
at *5 n.6; see, e.g., Highway Constr. Co. v. Moses, 483 
F.2d 812, 815 (8th Cir. 1973) (interpreting the South 
Dakota workers’ compensation statute and concluding 
that “[t]he employer’s immunity from suit by his 
employees, however, does not extend to immunize a 
personally negligent employee from suit by coworkers 
whom he has injured”). But see, e.g., Bresnahan v. Barre, 
190 N.E. 815, 817 (Mass. 1934). The Defoe opinion does 
not contain a major internal inconsistency—unlike the 
decision that the Ninth Circuit reversed in Haeuser. See 
368 F.3d at 1101 (reversing the Guam Supreme Court). 
Moreover, it is hard to fault the Supreme Court for 
not invoking ejusdem generis, a canon we use to discover 
legislative intent. The canon does not apply when the text 
and structure is sufficiently clear—which often is a close 
question, as it was in this case. See Waterfront Comm’n 
of N.Y. Harbor v. Elizabeth-Newark Shipping, Inc., 164 
F.3d 177, 184 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that “[t]he principle 
of ejusdem generis . . . is not a rule of law but merely a 
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useful tool of construction resorted to in ascertaining 
legislative intent. The rule should not be employed when 
the intention of the legislature is otherwise evident” 
(quotation marks and citation omitted)); Norfolk & W. 
Ry. v. Am. Train Dispatchers Ass’n, 499 U.S. 117, 129 
(1991) (“[Ejusdem generis] does not control, however, 
when the whole context dictates a different conclusion.”).  
Finally, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court 
considered the implications of its decision. It noted that if 
employers fear the costs of indemnifying their 
employees, they can contractually agree not to provide 
indemnification. Defoe, 2012 WL 37404, at *11. 
Although this argument ignores the reality that employers 
have already entered many contracts based on the 
assumption that such agreements are unnecessary, it is 
still a reasonable argument going forward. We therefore 
conclude that Defoe is neither manifestly erroneous nor 
inescapably wrong.  
* * * 
The Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands is on the 
road to Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) 
(requiring federal courts to defer to local courts on issues 
of local law). We are confident that it will soon reach its 
destination. For now, we defer to the Supreme Court on 
questions of local law, subject to a manifest-error 
standard of review, including with respect to our pre-
2007 precedents. Because the Supreme Court did not 
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manifestly err in rejecting Tavarez, we will affirm its 
judgment. 
 
   1 
ROTH, Circuit Judge, Concurring. 
 I agree with the Majority that we have jurisdiction 
of this petition for certiorari and that the Supreme Court 
of the Virgin Islands has the authority under 48 U.S.C. § 
1613 to disregard precedent set by the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals during a time when the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals was the only source of binding 
authority construing territorial law.  Because the grant of 
certiorari in this case bears only on the general question 
and does not speak of any consideration of manifest error 
in this specific case, I find Section V of the majority 
opinion to be beyond the scope of the grant of certiorari 
here.  For that reason, I conclude that Section V is not 
necessary to our response to this petition for certiorari 
and I do not join in it. 
 
